Cuillin Sound Voyage History

THE MERCHANT SHIPPING ACT, 1894

REPORT OF COURT

(No. 7965)

S.S. "James Clunies" O.N.181785

In the matter of a Formal Investigation held in the Justiciary Buildings, Glasgow, on the 27th, 28th, and 29th days of March, 1950, before James Wellwood Johnston, Esquire, Advocate, Sheriff-Substitute of Lanarkshire, assisted by Captain P. S. Robinson and Captain C. A. Hancock, into the circumstances attending the stranding of the s.s. "James Clunies" on Punta Mogotes Spit, Argentina, on the 21st April, 1949, and her subsequent total loss.

The Court, having carefully inquired into the circumstances attending the above-mentioned direct shipping casualty, finds, for the reasons stated in the Annex hereto, that the casualty was caused by the default of the master, John McIvor, and that his certificate be suspended for three years from 29th March, 1950.

Dated this 29th day of March, 1950.

J. Wellwood Johnston, Judge. P.S. Robinson & C.A. Hancock, Assessors.

We concur in the above report,

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS.

The Court's answers to the questions submitted by the Ministry of Transport are as follows:

Q1- By whom was the s.s. "James Clunies" owned?
A- Margareta Steamship Company, Limited, formerly of 3 Royal Exchange Square, Glasgow, and now of 193 Dalrymple Street, Greenock.

Q2- When, where and by whom was the s.s. "James Clunies" built?
A- 1944; West Hartlepool; Messrs. William Gray & Company, Limited.

Q3- With what compasses was the s.s. "James Clunies" supplied, and where were they placed on board?
A- A standard compass Admiralty pattern No. 196 on wheelhouse top; a steering compass Admiralty pattern No. 196 in wheelhouse; an emergency compass on the poop.

Q4- When were the compasses last adjusted?
A- As regards the first two, on 14th August, 1948.

Q5- Was the s.s. "James Clunies" supplied with adequate charts, sailing directions, and navigational publications, on her last voyage?
A- Yes. The master had tried unsuccessfully to obtain at Buenos Aires a chart on a larger scale than that which he had of the area where the stranding occurred, but we do not consider that the absence of such a chart affected matters.

Q6- Was the s.s. "James Clunies" provided with an echo sounding machine, mechanical sounding machine, hand lines and leads, and patent log?
A- Yes.

Q7- If there was an echo sounding machine on board was it in proper working order?
A- Yes.

Q8- Was the s.s. "James Clunies" provided with direction finding apparatus?
A- Yes.

Q9- Was the s.s. "James Clunies" fitted with wirelss transmitters and receivers?
A- Yes.

Q10- Was the s.s. "James Clunies" on the 21st April, 1949, proceeding to Monte Video for bunkers whilst on voyage from Bahia Blanca to Italy with a cargo of grain?
A- Yes.

Q11- What was the position of the s.s. "James Clunies" at approximately 7 a.m. ship's time on the 21st April, 1949, and how was that position ascertained?
A- Quequen light bearing 344° true, distant 10¾ miles, ascertained by running fix.

Q12a- (a) What course was set after the position at approximately 7 a.m. ship's time on the 21st April, 1949, was ascertained?
A- 061° True.

Q12b- What courses were steered between approximately 7 a.m. and noon ship's time on 21st April, 1949?
A- 061° True until about 11 a.m.; thereafter 048° True.

Q13- What was the noon ship's time position of the s.s. "James Clunies" on the 21st April, 1949, and how was it ascertained?
A- It was not ascertained at the time. From the evidence now available as to courses and speed it was probably about 38° 22' S 57° 50' W.

Q14- What was the wind, sea, and weather in-cluding visibility at noon ship's time on the 21st April, 1949?
A- Wind E.N.E. force 5; sea moderate; visibility variable, but poor during intermittent rain.

Q15- Was the echo sounding machine in use, and if so, what depths were recorded?
A- Yes; no reliable evidence as to depths recorded is available.

Q16- Were D.F. bearings obtained?
A- No.

Q17- What courses were steered between noon and 2.15 p.m. ship's time on the 21st April, 1949?
A- Until about 12.15 p.m. 048° True; thereafter various courses were steered to master's orders varying between 048° True and 008° True.

Q18a- When were Punta Mogotes Lighthouse and a line of breakers sighted, and in what direction?
A- 2.13 p.m.; on the port hand but ship stranded before bearing could be taken.

Q18b- What action was taken to avoid running aground when the lighthouse and breakers were sighted?
A- The ship stranded before action could be taken.

Q19a- When and where did the s.s. "James Clunies" strand?
A- 2.13 p.m. on Punta Mogotes Spit, Argentina.

Q19b- What was the wind, sea and weather including visibility at the time of the stranding?
A- Wind and sea as stated in Answer 14; visibility poor but clearing.

Q20- Were all the 44 members of the crew rescued and did the ship become a total loss?
A- Yes.

Q21- Why did the s.s. "James Clunies" strand?
A- Owing to imprudent alterations of course to port made on the master's orders from 11 a.m. onwards and his neglect to check position by direction finder and soundings.

Q22- Was the stranding and total loss caused or contributed to by the wrongful act or default of the master, John Aloysius McIvor?
A- Yes.

Q23- Was the stranding and total loss caused or contributed to by the wrongful act or default of the chief officer, Howard Greenlees?
A- No.

Q24- Was the stranding and total loss caused or contributed to by the wrongful act or default of the second officer, John Baird?
A- No.

ANNEX TO THE REPORT.

At this Inquiry Mr. T. W. Donald appeared for the Minister of Transport; Mr. David Murray (Messrs. Maclay, Murray & Spens) for the master, Captain McIvor, and also for the chief officer, Mr. Greenlees; Mr. T. G. Wright (Messrs. Wright, Johnston & Mackenzie) for the second officer, Mr. Baird, and also for the owners, the Margareta Steamship Company; and Mr. A. W. Sampson (Messrs. Wilson, Chalmers & Hendry) for the members of the crew, instructed by the National Union of Seamen.

The s.s. "James Clunies" was a single screw two-decked vessel built in 1944 by Messrs. William Gray & Company, Limited, at West Hartlepool, as an Admiralty store ship. In 1947 she was bought by the Margareta Steamship Company, Limited, of Greenock, and converted early in 1948 into a cargo ship. She was of 7849.84 tons gross, 431 feet long, 56 feet beam and 35 feet depth fitted with seven watertight bulkheads, triple expansion steam engines and three oil-fired cylindrical boilers. She had steam steering gear with telemotor control.

The vessel was well found and equipped with modern navigational aids including Hughes echo sounding apparatus and Lodestone direction finder besides usual compasses. When she sailed on her last voyage the equipment was in good working order.

The "James Clunies" sailed from Bahia Blanca on the morning of 20th April, 1949, with a full cargo of grain bound for Italy via Monte Video for bunkers. Her draft was 25 feet forward and 27 feet 2 inches aft. She carried a total complement of 44 and had adequate charts and navigational information.

At 7.02 a.m. on 21st April, her position was 10¾ miles from Quequen Lighthouse which bore 344° True. We accept the chief officer's ascertainment of this position as accurate. At this time she was being properly navigated on a safe course of 061° True. At 8 a.m. the third officer relieved the chief officer and the course was maintained until about 10.40 a.m. The ship was making about 9 knots at this time. The wind was E.N.E. force 5, the sky overcast and visibility somewhat variable and sometimes poor owing to heavy rain.

At about 10.40 a.m. course was altered 3° to port and shortly afterwards a further 10° to port on the orders of the master. We are disposed to accept the evidence of the third officer that he protested unsuccessfully to the master against these alterations of course and that he entered them in the scrap log as having been made on master's orders. At about 12.15 p.m. the second officer relieved the third officer and was informed by the latter of his misgivings about the course of 048° True then being steered, but the second officer was not disposed to question the master's orders. Between 12.15 p.m. and 2.13 p.m. various further alterations of course were made. These were entered at the time by the second officer in the scrap log, but neither oral nor written evidence is now available as to exact details. It is, however, clear that in general these were alterations still further to port until very shortly before the stranding, and were made on the master's orders. At one point a course of 008° True was being steered. Shortly before 2.13 p.m. some alteration of course to starboard was made by the master, but at that time Punta Mogotes Lighthouse and breakers ahead and to port became visible to the master and second officer, and before effective avoiding action could be taken the vessel grounded on Punta Mogotes Spit upwards of a mile from land.

It is not necessary to describe subsequent events in detail beyond recording that there was no loss of life, all the ship's company being ultimately taken off, and that the vessel became a total loss. It has not been suggested that any reasonable step to refloat this ship was neglected by the master or that her total loss, once she had stranded, might have been prevented.

The stranding of the vessel was entirely due to the default of the master. The course of 061° True which was being steered at 10.40 a.m. was a safe and proper one which might have been maintained for several hours. The total alteration of 13° to port made by the master around 11 a.m. was grossly imprudent. It should have been obvious to him if he had studied the situation that the new course of 048° True, if maintained, was bound to take the ship dangerously close to the Punta Mogotes Spit and inside the 4-fathom Banco Pescadores. In the event still further quite inexplicable alterations to port were made on the master's orders. We consider that the master was gravely at fault in ordering these alterations. No very intelligible explanation has been offered. It appears that the master was very anxious to get a visual bearing of Punta Mogotes Lighthouse. We also think that, considering the visibility and the risky course which he ordered, the master was seriously at fault in not attempting to check his position by direction finder bearing and soundings. He was aware that there was a D.F. transmitting station at the lighthouse and of its operational practice. Yet he took no steps to get a D.F. bearing. Further, he apparently paid little regard to soundings. The echo sounding apparatus was working and must have warned him, if he had paid attention to it, that he was getting too close inshore. So far as the chief officer is concerned, he had no part in the navigation of the ship after 8 a.m., when a safe course was being steered, and cannot be held in any way responsible for what happened. The third officer, having made his protest to the master and his entry in the scrap log, and having communicated his misgivings to the relieving second officer, clearly could do no more. His navigational sense was borne out by events. It is not possible to attribute positive blame to the second officer who was apparently content, without applying his own mind very seriously, to carry out the master's orders. He had, however, received a warning from the third officer and he had full opportunity to work out the ship's position and study her course for himself. While, therefore, he cannot be blamed, his conduct indicates a lack of initiative and interest in contrast to that of the third officer.

There is another matter about which, although it is not directly raised in the formal questions, we must make some comment. It will be seen from what has already been said that at the time of stranding the alterations of course made about 11 a.m. and the various further alterations made after 12.15 p.m., all on the master's orders, were recorded in the scrap log. Very shortly after the stranding the master on the bridge asked the second and third officers if they would stand by him in the event of an Inquiry, and in effect proposed that these alterations of course should be suppressed and the scrap log altered accordingly. In pursuance of this project some attempt to erase entries was made, but as this was unsatisfactory, the second officer a day or two afterwards in Mar del Plata tore out and destroyed the page of the log relating to 21st April and re-wrote it omitting all reference to changes of course after 8 a.m. The scrap log as now produced therefore bears that a course of 061° True was continuously maintained from 7.02 a.m. until the time of stranding. We cannot too strongly condemn this falsification of the scrap log, which can only have been made to provide written corroboration of false oral evidence which it was intended to give if occasion should arise.

Fortunately for those concerned this situation has not occurred. The third officer did not agree to the master's proposals at the time though he did not then, rather naturally, emphatically refuse. Later he took advice, and being wisely advised to tell the truth, has properly and courageously adhered to that course. We commend him on that account. If he had not done so the true facts about this casualty might never have come to light. A course of 061° True could not possibly have brought the "James Clunies" into the position where she stranded, and her loss would have remained a mystery which might have given rise to unnecessary speculation and unfounded suspicions.

For the highly reprehensible tampering with the log and the intention behind it the master must take the main responsibility. The best that can be said in mitigation is that he committed himself to this most unfortunate course while under the immediate stress and agitation of the stranding. His conduct in this matter has not inclined us to leniency in the penalty for his undoubted errors in navigation.

As to the second officer we appreciate the difficulty of his position, but his ready participation in this affair requires severe censure. In this matter as well as in the matter of navigation his conduct compares unfavourably with that of the third officer.

This is not, even yet, the end of the matter. The chief officer had no personal knowledge of the courses steered after 8 a.m. However much or little he may actually have heard, he was, however, well aware of discussion between the master and junior officers about courses and of an intention to conceal the actual courses. He was also well aware that the scrap log in its ultimate form was not as it was at the time of stranding. None the less, he was content and willing to transcribe the entries from the scrap log in its undoubtedly altered form in to his own log. There can be no doubt that he knew the scrap log had been re-written with entries altered or omitted. His explanation that so far as his watch was concerned the re-written entries were correct, and that beyond that he had no personal knowledge is quite insufficient. Further, as the holder of a master's certificate the chief officer must have been well aware of the importance attached to the entries in his log. While we do not propose to deal with his certificate we consider that his conduct in this matter indicates a serious failure to appreciate and undertake the responsibilities of his position, and calls for severe reprimand.

J. Wellwood Johnston, Judge