Blythville Technical Specification

"BLYTHVILLE" (S.S.)

IN the matter of the formal Investigation held at West Hartlepool, on the 26th of January 1886, before H. C. ROTHERY, Esquire, Wreck Commissioner, assisted by Captains CASTLE and WARD as Assessors, into the circumstances attending the damage sustained by the steamship "BLYTHVILLE," through an explosion of coal gas, on the 22nd of November 1885.

Report of Court.

The Court, having carefully inquired into the circumstances of the above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds, for the reasons annexed, that the explosion in question arose from the gas having been allowed to accumulate in the after hold; but that there is nothing to shew how it became ignited.

The Court is not asked to make any order as to costs.

Dated this 26th day of January 1886.


Annex to the Report.

This case was heard at West Hartlepool on the 26th of January 1886, when Mr. Howard Smith appeared for the Board of Trade, Mr. Tilly for the owners, and Mr. Forster for the master of the "Blythville." Sixteen witnesses having been produced by the Board of Trade and examined, Mr. Howard Smith handed in a statement of the questions upon which the Board of Trade desired the opinion of the Court. Mr. Tilly and Mr. Forster then addressed the Court on behalf of their respective parties, and Mr. Howard Smith having been heard in reply, the Court proceeded to give judgment on the questions on which its opinion had been asked. The circumstances of the case are as follow:—

The "Blythville" is an iron screw steamship, belonging to the port of West Hartlepool, of 1,390 tons gross and 897 tons net register, and is fitted with engines of 120 horse power. She was built at West Hartlepool in the year 1877, and at the time of the explosion which forms the subject of the present inquiry she was the property of Mr. William Gray, of Dock Head, West Hartlepool, and others, Mr. William Gray being the managing owner. She left Newport, in Monmouthshire, at about 5.30 p.m. on the 18th of November last, for Marseilles, with a crew of 19 hands all told, one passenger, and a cargo of 1,498 tons of coal, besides 251 tons in her bunkers. As the weather at the time was threatening, and it was blowing a fresh breeze from the E.S.E., with drizzling rain, the captain deemed it expedient not to open the ventilators, but instead thereof he took off the two foremost hatches from each hatchway to allow the gases to escape. At 10.30 a.m. of the following day, the 19th, the vessel was shipping heavy seas fore and aft, upon which the captain ordered the hatches to be battened down, and they remained so until 7 a.m. of the 20th, when, the wind and sea having gone down, the two foremost hatches were again taken off, but at about 7.30 p.m., the wind having gone to the S.W. and blowing strong, with a heavy sea, the hatches were again closed, and from this time the weather continued to be very bad, the vessel labouring and straining heavily, and shipping large quantities of water. At 4.40 a.m. of the 22nd they were off Cape Finisterre, the weather being the same, and at 4 p.m. orders were given to double the wheel chains, and in about 1/4 of an hour afterwards, and whilst the crew were thus engaged, an explosion occurred in the after hold, which lifted the deck from the bridge aft, blew off the after hatch, the skylight, and the companion, and set fire to the cabin. Orders were at once given to carry the hose aft, and by 2 a.m. of the 23rd they had succeeded in extinguishing the fire, when, finding that the vessel was seriously damaged, the master altered the course for Lisbon, which they reached at about 10 a.m. of the 24th. There the cargo was discharged, and the vessel having been temporarily repaired, she returned to West Hartlepool.

These being the facts of the case, I will now proceed to answer the questions which have been put to us by the Board of Trade, and I propose to take questions Nos. 1 and 2 together. They are as follow:—" 1. Whether, having regard to the nature of the cargo " on board the 'Blythville,' her holds were properly " and sufficiently ventilated, so as to ensure a system " of surface ventilation which would be effective in all " circumstances of the weather, when she left New- " port on the 18th November last?" "2. Whether " the ventilators and cowls were properly constructed, " fitted, and arranged, and whether they were of suffi- " cient strength to be serviceable in heavy weather for " the purpose intended?" The coal with which the vessel was laden was from the Risca and North Dunraven Collieries, which is admitted to be a very fiery coal, giving off large quantities of explosive gases, and in the working and shipping of which safety lamps are, we are told, always used. And as the coal had only been newly wrought, it was of the greatest importance that the holds should be properly and sufficiently ventilated. Now we are told that the after hold, in which the explosion occurred, and in which were stowed no less than 673 tons of coal, had two ventilators, one placed in the fore part of the hold about a foot abaft the bridge, and the other about the middle of the hold immediately abaft the after hatchway. Both were from three to four feet out of the centre line of the ship, the former being on the starboard side, whilst the latter was on the port side of it. They consisted of cowls some 4 1/2 feet high, made of sheet iron, which fitted over iron coamings, standing about 9 3/4 inches above the deck, and with a diameter inside of about 12 inches. In case of bad weather the cowls could be unshipped, wooden plugs inserted, and covered with tarpaulins. We are told that these ventilators were such as were usually fitted to vessels of the class of the "Blythville" at the time when that vessel was built, but that they are now almost obsolete, the coamings being generally much higher, standing, I am told, sometimes as much as 3 feet above the deck. This additional height would not only give the cowls a better and firmer hold, but would at the same time make it easier to keep the ventilators open in case of bad weather. These were the only means, apart from the hatchways, for ventilating the after hold, with this large quantity of inflammable coal in it; and, in the opinion of the Assessors, they were not sufficient. And the best proof that they were not so is to be found in the fact that since the explosion Mr. Gray, the owner, has, we are informed, determined to put in two more ventilators, one in the fore part of the hold, but upon the port side, the other a smaller one, quite in the after part of the hold, passing through the store room. In the opinion, then, of the Assessors, looking at the character of the coal which this vessel had in her, the two ventilators to the after hold were neither sufficient nor were they properly constructed, fitted, and arranged so as to be serviceable in heavy weather.

I will take questions Nos. 3 and 4 together; they are as follow:—"Whether the master was justified in " neglecting to ship the cowls of the ventilators after " the vessel left Newport" and "Whether every " possible effort was made to ventilate the holds " between the 19th and 22nd of November?" It is admitted that from the time of their leaving Newport the cowls were never shipped, but that the holes were plugged up and covered with tarpaulins. Now, although the weather is said to have been threatening when they left Newport, and it was blowing fresh from the E.S.E. with drizzling rain, it is obvious that, until they passed Lundy Island, they could have had no sea which would have prevented their carrying the ventilators open; and, indeed, it is obvious that, with the wind from the E.S.E., and therefore off shore, they could have carried them very well, until they had passed the Longships. It appears also from the log that in the evening of the 19th the wind fell, so that at 8 p.m. of that day they were able to set the fore and aft sails; and that they had light winds until about 8 p.m. of the 20th. Up to that time, therefore, there is no reason to think that they might not have kept the ventilators open; and although after that they had heavy weather with the sea washing fore and aft, and she was shipping large quantities of water, which would probably have rendered it impossible for them to have kept the ventilators open, that does not justify the master in not carrying the cowls up to the evening of the 20th. In our opinion, therefore, every possible effort was not made to ventilate the holds.

The fifth question which we are asked is, "Having " regard to the fact that the ventilators were closed " between the 19th and 22nd of November, did the " master warn the crew of the danger likely to arise " from using lights in the vessel?" The master admits that he did not give any warning on the subject to the crew. Having commanded this vessel for about five years, during which time he had carried a great number of cargoes of coals, several of them from South Wales, and without meeting with any accident, he was probably not sufficiently alive to the dangers arising from this class of coal. Mr. James Dixon, however, the foreman to the London and South Wales Coal Company, who superintended the shipment of the cargo, stated that he warned the mate to give the coal plenty of ventilation, and that the mate replied that they would do that for their own sakes; but the mate does not appear to have informed the master of the warning which he had received.

The sixth question which we are asked is, "What " was the cause of the explosion? and is the owner to " blame for it? and was it caused by any wrongful act " or default on the part of the master?" That the explosion was caused by some light or flame having come in contact with the gas, which had accumulated in the after hold, can hardly admit of a doubt; but how that flame came to be brought in contact with the gas, it is utterly impossible for us to say. It seems that on the evening of the 20th, when the weather became very bad, and the seas were breaking over the ship, the captain ordered the steward to put out the cabin fire, and to unship the funnel, and to place the brass cap over it, so as to prevent the water getting down into the cabin; and from that time we are told there was no fire in the cabin. We are also told that there was no other light of any kind in the cabin. It was only about a quarter after four, and in the ordinary course the steward would not light the cabin lamp until five, or a little after, when the master and officers would have their tea. Mr. Jones, the passenger, also told us that at the time of the explosion he was lying in his berth, and that he had been reading, and had just laid down his book, as it was becoming dusk, when the explosion occurred; he added that he had not any light in his berth, and that, so far as he is aware, there was no light in the cabin. The steward also, who was the only other person in the cabin, stated that, it being Sunday afternoon, he had been lying in his berth asleep, and had got up and was near the top of the companion stairs when the explosion took place; and he swore positively that, so far as he was aware, there was no light in the cabin, or in his berth, or in the pantry, at the time. That the explosion could have occurred without a light or a flame coming in contact with the gas, is impossible; but whence the light came, or how it got to the gas, it is quite impossible for us with the evidence which we have before us to say.

We are asked, however, whether the owner, Mr. Gray, is to blame for the explosion. It seems that the ventilators were such as would usually have been put into a vessel of her class and size at the time when she was built. Indeed Mr. Wotherspoon, the shipwright and engineer surveyor to the Board of Trade at this port, has told us that if he had seen the vessel, before the explosion occurred, he should not have considered that he would have been justified in ordering the ventilators to be altered. In this, however, we think that Mr. Wotherspoon is in error, for both the height of the coamings and the position of the aftermost of the two ventilators in the after hold were not well calculated to ventilate the hold properly, more especially in heavy weather. At the same time, after this expression of Mr. Wotherspoon's opinion, we hardly think that we should be justified in holding Mr. Gray to blame for not seeing a defect which Mr. Wotherspoon, whose special duty it is to look into these matters, admits that he should not have detected.

Lastly, we are asked whether the explosion was " caused by any wrongful act or default on the part of " the master," and it is added that, "in the opinion of " the Board of Trade, the certificate of the master " should be dealt with." Now, no doubt the master is to blame for not having put on the cowls, and kept the ventilators open, when he might have done so, that is, from the time of their leaving Newport until the evening of the 20th, but the question is, did this neglect contribute to the casualty. It was strongly urged by Mr. Forster that the gas which caused the explosion was probably given off by the breaking up of the coal during the severe weather which they encountered on the 22nd, and when it was not possible to open the ventilators; and in support of that contention he referred to the evidence of the steward, who stated that on the morning of the 22nd he went with a lighted candle into the store room, to give out the provisions for the day, and finding some water there he opened a small hatch in the floor to allow the water to run away into the hold, and that having done so he replaced the hatch. And Mr. Forster contended that if there had then been an accumulation of gas in the hold it would in all probability have exploded, and that it is therefore only fair to conclude that the gas which exploded accumulated during the day. If this were so the explosion would be due, not to the fact that the ventilators had been closed from the time of leaving Newport until the evening of the 20th, but to the accumulation of gas caused by the breaking up of the coal during the 22nd, when the ventilators could not have been kept open; and under these circumstances it could not be said that the explosion was due to any wrongful act or default on the part of the master. No doubt there is a good deal to be said for this view of the case; and seeing therefore that it has not been proved to our satisfaction that the explosion was due to any mistake on the part of the master, we should have no power to deal with his certificate.

Wreck Commissioner.
We concur.
JOHN S. CASTLE,
C. Y. WARD,
Assessors.

A scanned page from the book 'Argyll Shipwrecks', by Peter Moir and Ian Crawford (with the kind permission of Peter Moir), giving details of the wreck.