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Knaresbro - Board of Trade Wreck Report 1906

"KNARESBRO" (S.S.). 

The Merchant Shipping Act, 1894. 

IN the matter of a formal investigation held at the Municipal Buildings, West Hartlepool, on the 10th and 11th days of April, 1906, before ROBINSON MURRAY and ROBERT LAUDER, Esquires, Justices of the Peace for the County Borough of West Hartlepool, assisted by Captains W. BARNETT BIGLEY and ALEXANDER WOOD, into the circumstances attending the stranding and subsequent loss of the British steamship "KNARSBRO," of West Hartlepool, at or near Bovbierg, West Coast of Denmark, on or about the 5th day of March, 1906. 

Report of Court. 

The Court, having carefully inquired into the circumstances attending the above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds, for the reasons stated in the Annex hereto, that the stranding of the vessel was caused through neglect to use the lead while approaching the land in a dense fog; that the loss of the vessel was due to bad weather setting in after the stranding, which prevented salvage operations; and that the loss of the vessel was caused by the default of the master, Frank Newton Tyson, alone; but, having regard to his testimonials, the Court suspends his certificate for a period of three months only, and recommends that he be granted a first mate's certificate during the period of such suspension. 

Dated this 12th day of April, 1906.

R. MURRAY, R. LAUDER, Justices. We concur in the above Report: WM. BARNETT BIGLEY, A. WOOD, Assessors.

Annex to the Report. 

This was an inquiry into the circumstances attending the stranding of the British steamship "Knaresbro," and was held at the Municipal Buildings, West Hartlepool, on the 10th and 11th days of April, 1906, before Robinson Murray and Robert Lauder, Esquires, two of His Majesty's Justices of the Peace for the County Borough of West Hartlepool, assisted by Captains W. Barnett Bigley and Alexander Wood, Nautical Assessors. Mr. Percy Corder, solicitor, of Newcastle-upon-Tyne, appeared for the Board of Trade; Mr. A. T. Miller, solicitor, of Liverpool, for the master; and Mr. J. C. Thompson, solicitor (of Botterell, Roche, & Co.), of West Hartlepool, for the owners. The first and second officers appeared in person, but were not professionally represented. 

The s.s. "Knaresbro," formerly named the "Webster" (official number 98539), was a British screw steamer, built of steel at West Hartlepool in 1893 by Messrs W. Gray and Company, Limited, and was of the following dimensions: Length 325 ft.; breadth, 41.65 ft.; and depth of hold 21.4 ft. She was registered at the Port of West Hartlepool, and her tonnage, after deducting 1,082.45 tons for propelling power and crew space, was 2,018.83 tons register. She was propelled by three direct-acting expansion engines of 270 nominal horse-power. She was owned by Mr. Charles E. Smith and others, of whom Mr. Charles Edward Smith and William Abbey Smith, both of West Hartlepool, in the county of Durham, shipowners, were appointed managing owners, by advice under the hand of William Abbey Smith dated the 23rd August, 1899. The vessel had three compasses, and was supplied with an ordinary deep sea lead and line, a hand lead line, and also with Basnett's patent sounding apparatus and a Walker's patent taffrail log. She carried 40 life belts and six life buoys; she had four boats, two of which were lifeboats; and was well equipped in every respect for the voyage in question. 

The s.s. "Knaresbro" left Baltimore on the 13th February, 1906, laden with a cargo of 3,966 tons of maize, drawing 22 ft. 6 1/2 ins. forward and 22 ft. 7 1/2 ins. aft., bound for Svenberg and another port unnamed in Denmark. She was under the command of Mr. Frank Newton Tyson, who held a master's certificate of competency (No. 023452). Her crew consisted of 26 hands all told, and nothing worthy of note occurred during the voyage across the Atlantic. On the 3rd March at about 8.40 a.m. the vessel was off the East Goodwin Lightship, which bore when abeam about N.W. 1/2 W., distance half a mile. A course N.E. 1/2 N. northerly was then set by standard compass on the bridge. The deviation on this course was stated to be 5° easterly. This course was continued until noon of the following day, when the vessel's position by observation, as stated by the witnesses, was found to be 54° 22' north latitude and 5° 4' east longitude, which indicated that the vessel had practically made good her course. At this point the course was altered to N.E. 3/4 N. northerly by standard compass, the deviation being still 5° easterly. In setting this course the master stated he allowed half a point for a current setting towards the land, and that he expected to pass from 10 to 13 miles off Hanstholm light. The weather at this time was fine and clear, with a light breeze from W.S.W. The engines were going full speed, and the vessel making from 8 to 9 knots. 

The master went below at about 8 p.m., leaving the second officer in charge, with instructions to call him at once if there was any change in the weather or if anything else should render it necessary. During the second officer's watch the weather became thick and hazy, and at 11.30 p.m. the steam whistle was being sounded about every two minutes. At this time the second mate called the master, who at once came on deck and remained on the bridge until 11.55 p.m., when he went below, leaving orders to be called at once if the weather got worse, and to keep the steam whistle going if necessary, but the speed of the vessel was not reduced. The chief officer relieved the second at midnight, and continued sounding the steam whistle during his watch. Towards the close of the mate's watch he reduced the vessel to half speed and called the master, who then came on the bridge and remained in charge until the stranding. 

At 4.15 a.m. of the 5th March, 1906, the fog being very dense, the vessel's speed was reduced to slow, and at 5.10 a.m. of the same day she was felt to run aground, nothing having been previously seen or heard, by the master and second officer on the bridge nor the look-out man, to warn them of the danger they were running into. The engines were at once stopped and put full speed astern, the steam pressure being 160 pounds, which the chief engineer stated was a full head of steam. The engines were worked alternately full speed ahead and full speed astern. Orders were given to run out a kedge anchor astern, but whilst the kedge was being carried out the master discovered the rudder to be unshipped and stopped the operation. Soundings were taken around the vessel, which gave about 18 ft. amidships, 22 ft. forward, and 21 ft. aft. At daylight the fog lifted, and it was discovered that the vessel was ashore within three-quarters of a mile of Bovbierg Light. 

The master hoisted signals for assistance, and the chief officer endeavoured to communicate with the shore in the ship's boat, but was unsuccessful. In response to the signals two lifeboats came off alongside the vessel, and the master sent the second officer (who was a Dane and could speak the language) ashore in one of them with telegrams for owners and agents. He returned about 3 p.m. to the ship with a message from the Superintendent of the Life-Saving Appliance (who was also British Consul and Lloyd's Agent), advising the master that they should all come on shore for the night. After consultation with the mate, the master determined to act upon the advice. The anchors were let go. Number 4 tank had by this time become full through leakage, and Number 5 was filled to keep the vessel at rest and in the same position. The master on leaving took with him the articles and official log, but all the important documents relating to the navigation were left behind. 

Next morning the condition of the weather was such as to prevent anyone returning to the vessel, and continued so until the 13th March, when the vessel broke in two and became a total wreck. According to the statement of the master, the vessel seems to have been carried some 30 miles off her course towards the land from noon of the previous day up to the time of stranding. The non-use of the lead, the Court considers a grave omission, in view of the fact that the master himself stated that on previous occasions he had found his courses in crossing the North Sea much affected by current, and at page 12 of the North Sea Pilot, part 6, the mariner is specially warned against these currents and the necessity of using the lead strongly impressed upon. 

At the conclusion of the evidence Mr. Corder submitted the following questions for the opinion of the Court: 

(1) What number of compasses had the vessel, were they in good order and sufficient for the safe navigation of the vessel, and when and by whom were they last adjusted? 

(2) Did the master ascertain the deviation of his compasses by observation from time to time, were the errors correctly ascertained, and the proper corrections to the courses applied?

(3) Was the vessel supplied with proper and sufficient charts and sailing directions? 

(4) Were proper measures taken to ascertain and verify the position of the vessel at or about 8.40 a.m. of the 3rd March last, was a safe and proper course then set and thereafter steered, and was due and proper allowance made for tide and currents? 

(5) Was a safe and proper alteration made in the course at or about noon of the 4th March last, and was due and proper allowance made for tide and currents? 

(6) Having regard to the state of the weather after midnight of the 4th/5th March, was the vessel navigated at too great a rate of speed? 

(7) Was the lead used after midnight of the 4th/5th March; if not, should it have been used? 

(8) Was a good and proper look-out kept? 

(9) What was the cause of the stranding and loss of the vessel? 

(10) Was the vessel navigated with proper and seamanlike care? 

(11) Was the loss of the s.s. "Knaresbro" caused by the wrongful act or default of the master, chief and second officers, or of any of them? 

Mr. Miller having addressed the Court on behalf of the master and Mr. Thompson on behalf of the owners, the Court replied to the questions as follows: 

(1) The vessel had three compasses, viz.: a Whyte and Thompson standard compass, on the bridge, by which the courses were set and the vessel steered; one in the wheel-house under the bridge; and another aft. They were in good order, and sufficient for the safe navigation of the vessel. They were last adjusted at West Hartlepool by Messrs. Alf. Willings and Co., on August 25th, 1905. 

(2) The master stated that he ascertained the deviation of his compasses by observation from time to time. The errors appear to have been correctly ascertained, and the proper corrections to the courses applied. 

(3) The vessel was supplied with proper and sufficient charts and sailing directions. 

(4) Proper measures were taken to ascertain and verify the position of the vessel at or about 8.40 a.m. of the 3rd March last, a safe and proper course was then set and thereafter steered, and due and proper allowance was made for tide and currents. 

(5) If the position of the vessel at noon of the 4th March last was as stated in the evidence, a safe and proper alteration was then made in the course, and due and proper allowance was made for tide and currents; but in answering this and the preceding question it is to be noted that, while the articles and official log were saved, all documents relating to the navigation of the vessel were left on board when the vessel was abandoned, and therefore all data concerning the navigation of the vessel was simply a matter of memory. The Court, in these circumstances, has grave doubts as to the reliability of the evidence, considering what facts and figures the witnesses could and could not remember. 

(6) Having regard to the state of the weather after midnight of the 4th/5th March, the vessel was navigated at too great a rate of speed. 

(7) The lead was not used after midnight of the 4th/5th March, but it should have been used. 

(8) A good and proper look-out was kept. 

(9) The stranding of the vessel was caused through the neglect to use the lead while approaching the land in a dense fog. The loss of the vessel was due to bad weather setting in after the stranding, which prevented salvage operations. 

(10) The vessel was not navigated with proper and seamanlike care after midnight of the 4th March. 

(11) The loss of the s.s. "Knaresbro" was caused by the default of the master, Frank Newton Tyson, alone; but, having regard to his testimonials, the Court suspends his certificate for a period of three months only, and recommends that he be granted a first mate's certificate during the period of such suspension.

R. MURRAY, R. LAUDER, Justices. We concur: WM. BARNETT BIGLEY, A. WOOD, Assessors.

 (Issued in London by the Board of Trade on the 18th day of May, 1906.) 

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