Chicago - wreck report

"CHICAGO," (S.S.)


In the matter of the formal investigation held at the Police Court, West Hartlepool, on the 24th and 25th May 1878, before H. C. ROTHERY, Esquire, Wreck Commissioner, assisted by Rear-Admiral POWELL, R.N., and Captain N COLAS, as Assessors, into the circumstances attending the stranding of the British steamship "CHICAGO," of West Hartlepool, on the Long Sand, on the 8th instant, whilst on a voyage from Newcastle-on-Tyne to Boston, United States of America.

Report of Court.

The Court having carefully inquired into the circumstances of the above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds, for the reasons stated in the annexed judgment, that the stranding of the said vessel "Chicago" was due to the wrongful acts and defaults of Michael Pennock Lund, her master, in neglecting, after passing the Newarp light-ship, to lay her on a course which would take him more to the eastward, although he knew, before he had reached the Dudgeon, that she was getting to the westward of her proper course; and in not taking proper measures to verify his position after sighting a buoy, which he erroneously supposed to be the Inner Gabbard, but which was in fact the Shipwash.

The Court therefore suspends the certificate of the said Michael Pennock Lund for six months, but recommends that during the period of such suspension he be allowed a first mate's certificate.

The Court makes no order as to costs.

Dated this 25th day of May 1878.

 Judgment.

The Commissioner. The "Chicago" was an iron screw steamship of 1,383 tons gross measurement, and 892 tons net register, and was fitted with two direct-acting surface condensing engines of 140 horse-power combined. She was a perfectly new vessel, built in the present year by the eminent shipbuilders Messrs. William Gray and Company, of West Hartlepool, and was at the time of her loss the property of Mr. William Gray and Mr. Christopher Furness, of this town, the latter being the managing owner.

On being prepared for sea, she was sent to Newcastle, there to take in a cargo of coal. She arrived there at 5 p.m. on Saturday the 4th of May instant, commenced loading at 9 p.m. on the Monday following, and having completed her cargo, left Newcastle at 5 a.m. on the 7th, bound to Boston in the United States. She had in all a cargo of 1,000 tons, besides bunker coal, drew 16 feet 6 inches forward and 17 feet 11 inches aft, and had a crew of 23 hands all told.

After obtaining an offing of from four to five miles, a course was laid to pass at a distance of from five to six miles from Flamborough Head. I will speak presently of the courses on which the vessel was laid; it is sufficient here to say that after passing Flamborough Head, which she did at about 2.30 p.m., she was steered for the Outer Dowsing, but instead of making that point she picked up the Dudgeon light-ship, which she passed at about 8.45 p.m. At 11 p.m. she made Cromer, passed between Cromer and Hasborough Sand, then left the Newarp lightship on her starboard hand, and at 2.10 a.m. of the 8th, the course was altered to the southward and westward. It was the chief mate's watch on that morning from 4 to 8, and accordingly, at 4.30 a.m. the captain, who had been on deck from the time of leaving Newcastle, went into the chart room, and lay down. At 5 o'clock he came out again, and ordered the course to be altered half a point to the westward, and therefore nearer the shore, and again went into the chart room. At 7 o'clock the mate, observing what he believed to be a buoy on the starboard beam, called the master, who on coming out examined it with his glasses, but failed to make it out. A cast of the lead was then taken, which gave 14 fathoms, and they thereupon concluded that it was the buoy on the Inner Gabbard. The vessel was then put at half speed, and her head laid half a point off the shore. At this time the weather had become rainy and foggy, so that they could not see more than a mile or a mile and a half distant. At 8.5 or 8.10 the captain, who had continued on deck from the time of coming out at 7 o'clock, went below to have his breakfast, leaving the chief mate in charge, and in about 15 minutes afterwards returned on deck, when he observed broken water about 
three points on the starboard bow. He thereupon ordered the helm to be starboarded, the engines to be stopped, and a cast of the lead to be taken. The first cast gave 10 fathoms; another cast was then taken which gave 7 fathoms. The engines were thereupon ordered to be put full speed astern; another cast of the lead was taken, which gave four fathoms, and the next cast gave only three fathoms. At this time the boatswain called out that they were shoaling, and taking the ground astern; upon which the master ordered the engines to be put on ahead full speed; but the vessel would not move, having taken the ground amidships, with her head bearing about S.E. It was now about 9 a.m., and nearly low water.

Soon after the ship had grounded, the weather cleared up, and it was then discovered that they had grounded on the inner side of the Long Sand, about a mile and a half from the north-east point of it. One of the boats was immediately lowered, and soundings were taken round the ship; and, it having been found that the water was deeper on the port side, an anchor was carried out from the port bow. At about 11.15 another anchor was carried out from, I think, 
the port quarter. At about 11.30 a smack came up and offered her services, which were however refused; but at 12.30, the tide having then flowed for some time, and the vessel still remaining fast, the master engaged some smacksmen to help to lighten the vessel. At 1.30 they began to throw over the coals from both hatchways; but at 4 o'clock they were obliged to desist, owing to the seas which were breaking over the vessel. Two other smacks had in the meantime been engaged to assist, one of which had been sent to Harwich for a steamer.

At 6.30 p.m. the smacksmen left her, and wished the crew to go with them, but the crew very properly refused to do so. In the meantime the vessel had been beating heavily upon the sand, and had in consequence begun to make water; and accordingly at 9 o'clock the master thought it prudent to take to the boats. After lying off for about two hours they pulled to the Sunk light-vessel, but returned on the following day, when they found her almost full of water. And this fine vessel, worth as we are told 23,500l., with a cargo valued at 1,000l., 
ultimately became a total wreck.Now there is no charge against either the master or the crew for anything which they did after the vessel took the ground. They lowered the boats with great expedition, and laid out the anchors in a proper and judicious manner. Nor can we blame the master for having refused to accept the services of the smacksmen when they were first offered; for at that time he might reasonably have expected that the vessel would come off as the tide flowed; and in that case he would have saved his owners the expense of having to employ the smacksmen, who are not always very moderate in their demands. The crew too, it appears to us, behaved extremely well in refusing to leave the vessel when invited to do so by the smacksmen. I may add that the way in which the witnesses have given their evidence, the captain as well as the officers and men, was very creditable to them. They seem to be a very intelligent set of men, and it is deeply to be regretted that so fine a vessel, with apparently so good a crew, should have been lost so soon after leaving harbour. The question, however, which we have to consider, is not what occurred after the stranding, but how it came to pass that a vessel bound down Channel should have got so far out of her course, as to have grounded on the Long Sand. Now it must never be forgotten that the principal object of these inquiries is not so much to apportion praise or blame to the officers of the vessel, but to ascertain how the casualty occurred, and for this purpose it will require a most careful and perhaps wearisome examination of the courses which this vessel steered from the time of leaving Newcastle.

I should state that the vessel had three compasses on board, a pole compass, a bridge compass, placed before the midship wheel, from which she was steered, and an after compass. All these compasses, we are told, had been adjusted shortly before the vessel left Newcastle; and the deviation card, with which the master had been furnished, was handed in by him. Some difficulty arose from the master and officers having always spoken of the vessel's course by the pole compass, whereas the men naturally enough told us the course which they steered by the bridge compass. The master, however, in answer to questions which were put to him by the Court, told us the corresponding courses by the bridge compass; and these substantially agreed with those given by the men, there being a. difference of only about a quarter of a point between them. We thus know how the 
pole and how the bridge compass pointed, and from this we shall have to ascertain what were the vessel's true magnetic courses between the time of her leaving Newcastle and the stranding.

According to the master, the vessel, on taking her departure from Souter Point, was laid on a S.S.E. course by the pole compass, and that course was continued until after they had passed Cromer. Now, if we looked at a chart, we shall find that a S.S.E. course magnetic from off Souter Point would take a vessel some 5 or 6 miles clear of Flamborough Head. And the master has told us that, as his deviation card shewed him that for a S.S.E. magnetic course he must steer by the pole compass 1/4 S., in other words that on a S.S.E. course the pole compass had a westerly deviation of a 1/4 of a point, he thought that he would be quite safe 
in steering that course, as it would take him 1/4 of a point further from the coast than he had any occasion to go. Before reaching Flamborough Head, however, he observed that the vessel was drawing more to the westward than he expected, but the measures which he took, and what they were I will presently say, prevented his getting away to the westward, for as a fact he passed some 5 or 6 miles outside of Flamborough Head. After passing Flamborough Head he continued the same course as before, S.S.E. by the pole compass, which according to his deviation card was equivalent to a S.S.E. 1/4 E. magnetic course, and which he supposed would bring him with the Outer Dowsing bearing right ahead. He, however, missed the Outer Dowsing, but picked up the Dudgeon light-ship, which he passed at a distance of some 4 or 5 miles, shewing that he must have got some 6 or 7 miles to the westward of his course from leaving Flamborough Head. It ought therefore to have been clear to him that his pole compass, by which he had been steering, was not to be relied upon. Let us now see how the bridge compass was pointing during all this time. According to the master the bridge compass was S. by E. 1/4 E., according to the men it was S. by E. 1/2 E. Now the deviation card shews that for a S. by E. course magnetic, we ought to steer by the bridge compass S. by E. 1/4 E. According then to the bridge compass, the vessel's course from Souter Point was 
S. by E. magnetic, which is a very different thing from S.S.E 1/4 E. the course which the master thought that he was making according to the indications afforded by the pole compass. How to account for this difference of 1 1/4 points it is very difficult to say; we can hardly suppose that both officers and men have made a mistake as to the course shewn by the bridge compass, and we must conclude either that the master has not told us the correct course by the pole compass at that time, or that the deviation card was in error. This, however, ought to have excited the master's vigilance, for if the bridge compass was correct, the vessel was being carried 1 1/4 points further to the west and therefore nearer to the shore than the master anticipated; and he had already had very clear proof before reaching Flamborough Head, and again before making the Dudgeon light-ship, that he could not rely upon his pole compass, and that he was being carried to the westward of his course.

Mr. Tilly, however, who appeared for the master, contended that the bridge compass must have been equally at fault; for that, if the course steered from Souter Point had really been S. by E. magnetic, as shewn by that compass, she would have been ashore long before she reached Flamborough Head. No doubt that is so; but we must remember that it was broad daylight at that time, and that the land was distinctly visible; and if before reaching Flamborough Head the master observed, as he admits he did, that the vessel was continually drawing in to the westward, his natural and proper course would be to obviate this tendency 
by slightly starboarding his helm. He tells us, that on taking his departure from Souter Point he laid his course so as to pass from 5 to 6 miles outside Flamborough Head, and that as he approached the Head he found that the vessel was closing in with the land, and that he took steps to prevent it. Now what steps could he have taken other than that of starboarding the helm?

Mr. Tilly. Excuse me, Sir, I think we had it in evidence from the captain, and from the other officers, and from the man at the wheel, that the ship's helm was never altered.

The Commissioner. I must take the evidence as it is before me. The master failed to give any answers to the questions that I put to him. 1 asked him, if on taking his departure from Souter Point he had laid his course so as to pass between five and six miles outside of Flamborough Head, and he said he had. I asked him whether he did not find before he reached Flamborough Head that he was being drawn out of his course to the westward, and he said he did. And I then asked him as a matter of fact, whether he had not passed within five or six 
miles outside Flamborough Head, and he said he had. Now if he was being set to the westward of his course all the way from Souter Point to Flamborough Head, I want to know how is it possible that he could have passed at the distance from Flamborough Head, which he said that he had intended to do when he laid his course, unless he had starboarded his helm.

Mr. Tilly.If you will excuse my calling your attention to the charge, he is charged with finding, when he got to Flamborough Head, that the ship had got nearer the land than he expected her to be; and that is a fact, because his evidence is, that he did not expect the ship to go some five or six miles off Flamborough Head, but that as a fact she was some five or six miles off Flamborough Head.

The Commissioner. I have his evidence before me, in which he says that he laid the course to go outside of Flamborough Head. Q. How far outside Flamborough Head did you expect that to take you? About five or six miles There can be no question whatever upon the point. This gentleman knew before he reached Flamborough Head that the vessel, when steered by the pole compass, was being taken to the westward of her course. He knew when he made the Dudgeon light-ship that the error was being continued, and that between Flamborough Head and the Dudgeon light-ship she had got some six or seven miles to the westward of her 
course, and therefore nearer the land. He knew, or ought to have known, that his bridge compass showed him to be on a course much more to the west than he supposed himself to be on, and yet he continues to navigate the vessel by his pole compass, which he must have known to be wrong. He passed the Newarp light-ship at 1 a.m., leaving it on the starboard hand at a distance of about two miles, and stood away to the S.E. until about 2.10 a.m., when the course was altered to the southward and westward. According to the master, the course 
steered from 2.10 to 5 a.m. was S.S.W. 1/2 W. by the pole compass; from 5 to 7 a.m. it was half a point more to the westward, or S.W. by S., when it was altered back again to S.S.W. 1/2 W. Now the deviation card shows the pole compass to have had on those courses a westerly deviation of about half a point; so that according to the pole compass the vessel's course from 2.10 to 5 a.m. would be S.S.W. magnetic, from 5 to 7 a.m. half a point more to the west, and after 7 a.m. S.S.W. again magnetic. Now no doubt these courses, had they been 
the true magnetic courses, would have taken the vessel clear away to the east of the Kentish Knock, but this of course is on the assumption that the pole compass, as corrected by the deviation card, could be relied upon. Let us now see what course the bridge compass shewed during this time. According to the master the bridge compass from 2.10 to 5 a.m. shewed S.S.W. 1/4 W., from 5 to 7 a.m. S.S.W. 3/4 W., and after 7 a.m. S.S.W. 1/4 W., and those are very nearly if not exactly the courses which the men say that they steered. On looking, however, at the deviation card, we find that at every point from S.S.W. to W. the bridge compass had an easterly deviation of one point; thus to make a S.S.W. magnetic course they had to steer by bridge compass S. by W., to make S.W. magnetic they must steer S.W. by S., and so on. So that according to this, when the bridge compass pointed S.S.W. 1/4 W., the vessel was on a S.W. 3/4 S. magnetic course; and when it shewed S.S.W. 3/4 W., the vessel was on a S.W. 1/4 S. magnetic course. We thus see that from 2.10 to 5 a.m., whilst the pole 
compass seemed to shew that the vessel was on a S.S.W. magnetic course, the bridge compass indicated her to be on a S.W. 3/4 S. magnetic course; from 5 to 7 a.m., whilst the pole compass shewed her course to be S.S.W. 1/2 W. magnetic, the bridge compass gave it as S.W. 1/4 S. magnetic; and from 7 a.m., whilst by the pole compass the magnetic course was S.S.W., it was by the bridge compass S.W. 3/4 S. magnetic, a difference in each case of one point and a quarter. So that, if the bridge compass was correct, the vessel was being carried 1 1/4 points more to the westward than the master supposed. Surely such a fact ought to have attracted the attention of the master, more especially after the experience of the previous part of the voyage, which must have shewn him that the pole compass was not to be relied upon, and that the bridge compass was more correct. I ought to add that, if the courses on which the vessel was steered were those shewn by the bridge compass; namely, from 2.10 to 5 a.m. S.W. 3/4 S. magnetic, and 5 to 7 o'clock S.W. 1/4 S. magnetic, that would in fact bring her 
very near the Shipwash Sand, and where she no doubt was, when the buoy was sighted; and that from there a S.W. 3/4 S. course magnetic would take her on the Long Sand, very nearly to the point where she grounded. We think then that we have thus an explanation of the way in which this casualty occurred. The pole compass and bridge compass, after allowing for the deviations according to the deviation card, shewed a difference of 1 1/4 points in the vessel's magnetic course. The master chose to rely upon his pole compass, although he had had clear proof, first in approaching Flamborough Head, and afterwards when he made the Dudgeon, that that compass could not be relied upon, and that it was taking him to the westward of his course, and therefore in shore. He chooses, although ignorant of his position, to go ahead full speed, in weather so foggy that he is not able to see further than a mile off; and when he sees the Shipwash buoy, he jumps to the conclusion that it is the Inner Gabbard, and takes no steps to verify the fact, or to ascertain his true position.

Now the charges which Mr. Hamel has preferred against the master are these: I hereby charge you with having caused the stranding of your vessel, the 'Chicago,' on the Long Sand, on the 8th day of May instant, through your default in negligently navigating your said vessel, between 1 a.m. on the said 8th day of May, when the Newarp light-ship bore west, distant about two miles, and the time of stranding; in neglecting, when setting your courses, to make 
proper allowance for the deviation in your standard compass, which you found to exist, first on sighting Flamborough Head about 2 p.m. on the 7th May, after you had run your course from Souter Point, and secondly, on sighting the Dudgeon light-ship about 8 p.m. on the same day, when you were expecting to make the Outer Dowsing; in neglecting to make all due allowance for the set of the tides during your said voyage; and in neglecting to verify your position by any further cast of the lead after the one taken at 7 a.m. on the said 8th day of May on sighting a buoy, which you failed to recognise and erroneously took for the Inner Gabbard.

In our opinion these charges have been substantially proved. The master had full warning, before he reached the Dudgeon, that his pole compass could not be relied upon, that he was getting to the westward of his course, and therefore nearer to the shore than he should have been, and yet he goes on at full speed, knowing that he was approaching a very dangerous navigation, and without taking any steps to verify his true position. We are told that this gentleman has been for 29 years at sea; that he has held a master's certificate of competency for 17 years, and has been in command of sailing ships for 16 years. It seems that, although he has served as chief mate on board steamers, this is the first time he has commanded one, and we think that in dealing with the errors of compasses, which are so common, especially in new iron ships, he has not shown that intelligence which might have been expected of him, and which is so essential for officers who are placed in command of this class of vessels. Under all the circumstances of the case, and notwithstanding the very high character which he has received from his employers, we shall suspend his certificate as master for six months. We shall at the same time recommend to the Board of Trade that during the time of its suspension he be allowed a first mate's certificate; and we trust that during those six months he will take every opportunity to improve himself in those branches of his profession which are so necessary to qualify him for the command of iron steam vessels. One point which came out in the course of the evidence yet remains to be noticed. It was said that from 6 a.m. of the Monday until 4.30 a.m. of the Wednesday, when he turned into the chart room for a short time, the master had had no rest, and this apparently was offered as some excuse for any deficiencies which he might have shown. Whether it is desirable that vessels should be laden 
with such rapidity as this vessel seems to have been, and that she should be sent to sea with the master so fatigued that he was not in a condition to give his best attention to the discharge of his duties, and with the prospect before him of having to take his vessel through a very difficult navigation, is a question which I think owners will do well to consider. I do not know whether Mr. Hamel asks for any costs in this case, but on the whole I think we should not feel disposed to condemn this man in costs.

Mr. Hamel. I certainly shall not ask for them, Sir, after that expression of opinion.

The Commissioner. I shall not condemn the master in costs. It is not usual for the Board of Trade to press for the payment of costs, except in cases of very gross misconduct. All that we shall do therefore will be to suspend the master's certificate for six months, and at the same time to recommend that he should have a chief mate's certificate.

The total cost of the two day inquiry came to £115 1s 8d.

Related items :