Clavering - Wreck Report

(No. 7054.) 

"CLAVERING" (S.S.). 

The Merchant Shipping Act, 1894. 

IN the matter of a formal investigation held at the County Court, Middlesbrough, on the 26th, 27th, 28th, and 30th days of March, and the 3rd day of April, 1907, before JOHN FREDERICK WILSON and STANLEY AUBREY SADLER, Esquires, assisted by Admiral R. M. LLOYD, Captains HORE and BIGLEY, and A. GRAY, Esquire, into the circumstances attending the stranding of the British s.s. "CLAVERING," of London, on the inner side of the North Gare Sand, near the mouth of the River Tees, whereby she became a total wreck and loss of life ensued. 

Report of Court. 
The Court, having carefully inquired into the circumstances attending the above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds, for the reasons stated in the Annex hereto, that the loss of the s.s. "Clavering" was caused by her not having sufficient headway to keep her under proper control and in the fairway of the Channel after leaving No. 3 buoy, when the tugs had cast off, and the pilot was endeavouring to arrange for the after tug to land him. The circumstance under which 19 of the crew perished was the inability of the lifeboats (after their first successful attempt) to get off to the wreck again until the morning of the following day, by which time the men had been washed overboard or died of exposure. The Court further finds that the loss of the S.S. "Clavering" was caused by the wrongful act and default of the pilot, Mr. Ernest Harrison, and serious blame attaches to him. The master, Mr. James Scott, is deserving of severe censure for not exercising more diligent supervision in the navigation of his vessel. No blame attaches to Mr. H. A. K. Bevan, second officer, Mr. Ralph Sadler, third officer, or Mr. Donald Macpherson, chief engineer. 

And this Court orders that the pilot, Mr. Ernest Harrison, do pay ten pounds towards the costs of this inquiry. 

Dated this 3rd day of April, 1907. JOHN F. WILSON, STANLEY A. SADLER, Justices. 
We concur in the above Report. KENNETT HORE, WM. BARNETT BIGLEY, RODNEY M. LLOYD, A. GRAY, Engineer. Assessors. 

Annex to Report. 
This was an Enquiry into the circumstances attending the stranding and loss of the British s.s. "Clavering," on the North Gare Sand, at the mouth of the River Tees, on the 31st of January last, whereby loss of life ensued, and was held at the County Court, Middlesbrough, before J. F. Wilson and Stanley A. Sadler, Esquires, Justices of the Peace, on the 26th, 27th, 28th and 30th of March, and the 3rd of April, 1907. 

Mr. W. S. Burton presented the case for the Board of Trade, and explained the story of the stranding and the efforts made to save life, and now a number of Lascars succumbed during the night to the intense cold and the severity of the storm, and how the vessel became a total wreck on the sands at the north side of the river. 

Mr. L. Noad, barrister, instructed by Mr. George Barnley, appeared for the owners of the vessel, Messrs. Hazlehurst & Co., of London; Mr. Miller, of Liverpool, represented the master, Mr. James Scott; Commander Holmes attended on behalf of the National Lifeboat Institution; and Mr. J. H. Amos was present at the request of the Tees Conservancy Commissioners to answer any questions that might be asked regarding the river and the various buoys and channels. 

Mr. Ernest Harrison, the pilot of the "Clavering," the second and third officers, Mr. H. A. K. Bevan and Mr. Ralph Sadler, and the chief engineer, Mr. Donald Macpherson, were not represented by counsel, but appeared in person. 

The "Clavering" (official number 95045) was a screw steamer, schooner rigged, built of steel in 1888, by Messrs. Workman, Clark, & Co., Limited, Belfast, and of the following dimensions: Length. 361.7 feet; breadth, 42.7 feet; and depth of hold 26.4 feet. Gross tonnage, 3328.36 tons and registered tonnage, 2154.79 tons. She was fitted with triple expansion direct acting inverted engines of 350 h.p. combined by Messrs. J. & J. Thomson, of Glasgow, the diameter of the cylinders being 25 1/2 inches, 43 inches, and 67 1/2 inches respectively, and length of stroke 48 inches. 

She carried six lifeboats and one jolly boat, and had 10 life rafts stowed on the after wheel-house and a full complement of lifebelts according to the official regulations. All the boats were properly supplied with oars and fittings, having been inspected by the surveyor in London just previous to her arrival in Middlesbrough, and she also carried three compasses which were in good order and properly placed. 

She steered by steam, a wheel standard being fitted in a small wheel-house on the bridge, the diameter of which was about 5 feet 6 inches. 

The "Clavering" was owned by the Clavering Steamship Co., Limited, of Billiter House, Billiter Street, City of London. Mr. Edmund Haslehurst, of that address, being designated the managing owner under date of November 28th, 1900. 

The hull and machinery were insured for £26,000, but no evidence was offered as to the value of the cargo. 

The vessel loaded about 5,000 tons of pitch and iron, and was under the command of Mr. James Scott, who holds a certificate of competency numbered 96344. 

On the 31st of January, 1907, at 4.50 a.m. the Clavering left the Middlesbrough Dock with a crew of 62 hands all told, bound for Japan and in charge of Mr. Ernest Harrison, licensed pilot, her draught of water being 24 feet 1 inch forward and 24 feet 3 inches aft. She was under her own steam and accompanied by two tugs, the "Hero" ahead and the "Challenger" astern. Being a vessel of heavy draught she was obliged to proceed very slowly and was assisted in taking the various bends of the river by the tugs checking her ahead and astern, and occasionally reversing her own engines to keep her in mid-channel. 

On reaching No. 3 buoy at about 6.20 a.m., the leading tug "Hero" cast off as her master considered the weather too unfavourable to proceed further. It was then blowing a strong gale from the northward and a heavy north east sea running at the bar and breaking on the sands, and the weather dark but clear. 

Soon afterwards the "Challenger" also let go but followed the vessel down to No. 2 buoy with the view of taking the pilot back if required. 

When the tugs cast off the hawsers were hauled in and stowed away by the steamer's crew. The pilot having requested the master of the "Clavering" to slow down now left the bridge and went aft to hail the "Challenger"; having failed to make himself understood he returned to the bridge and the "Challenger" proceeded to turn round and steam up the river, being at this time close to No. 2 buoy. 

Meanwhile, the master finding the vessel was losing her headway and closing No. 2 buoy had put the telegraph full speed ahead, which order the pilot repeated. The master at the same time telling the pilot that he was not going to humbug about any longer trying to land him and that he would have to go on in the steamer to Dover or wherever he could land him, to which the pilot assented. 

From the evidence of John Filburn, the keeper of the South Gare Lighthouse (who came on duty at 6.20 a.m. that morning and was watching the vessel), the "Clavering" passed the lighthouse at 6.25 by his clock and never got to the eastward of a line drawn from the Heugh Light at Hartlepool to the South Gare Lighthouse. 

She was apparently well over to the North-west side of the Channel and appeared to be in difficulties soon after passing his station as she was making no headway, and he assumed she had broken down as she stranded soon after. From the evidence of the master, the engines had been going at full speed only for about three minutes when the chief officer who had come on to the bridge and was watching the steering, reported to the pilot that the ship's head had gone off her course two points to the northward and was N. 22° E. instead of N. 47° E. In reply to the master, who asked what he was going to do, the pilot said continue at full speed, at the same time ringing the telegraph backwards and forwards to repeat the order of full speed to the engine room, ordering the helm a-port and then hard-a-port. 

Finding the vessel did not respond to the port helm and that she was getting in dangerous proximity to the North Gare Sand, the order was given to put the engines full speed astern, this apparently had the desired effect. The vessel recovered herself and paid off to E.N.E., the engines were then stopped and again put full speed ahead and the helm steadied. 

Although the engines were going at full speed ahead it was soon apparent that the vessel was not responding to the engines and would not answer her helm, but continued to fall off to E.S.E. and S.S.E., and it was evident that her keel had taken the ground and that she was stranded. In a few minutes the heavy sea and tide drove her on to the North Gare Sand and she commenced to bump heavily, the sea breaking over her fore and aft smashing the lifeboats amidships and pouring down the engine room skylight and fiddley gratings into the stokehold. 

The Lascar firemen becoming frightened left the stokehold and rushed on deck, but the engineers kept the engines going as long as possible and they were finally stopped about 25 minutes after the vessel had stranded, which according to the lighthouse keeper's evidence was 7 a.m. and two hours after high water at the bar. 

Signals of distress were made from. the vessel, the steam whistle was blown and blue lights burnt to attract attention. 

The boatman in charge of the coast guard detachment at the South Gare station telephoned at once to his chief officer at Coatham, informing him that a vessel was ashore on the North Gare Sand, and he in turn telegraphed to the different lifeboat stations to that effect. 

The Seaton Carew lifeboat was then brought overland to the "Inner Deep" where she was launched about 10 a.m., and after two attempts reached the ship, and having been brought alongside with great difficulty succeeded in taking 14 Lascars and the third engineer off the wreck and eventually landed them on the beach at the place where she started from. 

It was suggested that she might have put these men on board the tug which was lying in the Channel in close proximity and only about 100 yards from the "Clavering," but the opinion of the coxswain who was in charge of the lifeboat (a man of some 44 years' experience), was that the boat being a small one there would have been great danger of her capsizing if the sea had been brought on her quarter when she had as many men on board as she could safely carry. 

Shortly after landing the men the lifeboat made another attempt to reach the vessel and succeeded in getting within about 50 yards of the wreck, but the men being exhausted with the heavy weather and the flood tide the boat was swept into the Channel where she was picked up by the tug "Champion" and towed into Seaton Snook; there the boat was made fast for the time being and the men went home to rest as nothing more could be done until slack water. 

Finding the lifeboat did not return, an attempt was made by the officers and crew of the "Clavering" to get over and lower the remaining lifeboat and the jollyboat belonging to the ship. This was a work of great difficulty as the ship was listing heavily to port and the sea was making a complete breach over her and sweeping everything before it. The jollyboat was put over the side first but swamped immediately, the lifeboat was eventually got out and lowered, and although damaged and filled with water, the pilot, the second officer and four Lascars managed to get into her before she broke adrift and was swept away from the vessel by the flood tide into the channel where she was afterwards picked up by the tug "Glen Rosa." 

Two of the Lascars had died and been washed out of her before reaching the tug. Meanwhile the crew of the West Hartlepool lifeboat volunteered and arranged to take out the Seaton Carew lifeboat and make another attempt to reach the wreck during the afternoon against the flood tide, and she was accordingly towed out by the tug "Hibernia" at about 4 p.m. and got within 200 yards of the wreck. After lying off three-quarters of an hour, and as they could see no signs of life on board her, they rowed back to Seaton Snook, and made fast. 

About 10 p.m. the Seaton Carew coxswain and his crew made another attempt to reach the wreck, and the Hartlepool fishermen's lifeboat having been brought over by horses and men from the North Sand, both lifeboats left Seaton Snook together. Both boats, however, stranded shortly afterwards on the training wall, and were detained for about half-an-hour before they could be floated. They then rowed into the channel but grounded again, and finally succeeded in pulling within 150 yards of the wreck, but seeing no one on board a light was exhibited, and shouting was heard. The tide was now running strongly, and the heavy sea and long pull had so exhausted the crews that it was not considered safe to go alongside, and both boats returned to Seaton Snook to wait till daylight. The following morning at about 7 a.m., wind and sea having moderated, both boats were towed out to the vicinity of the wreck, and were at last successful in taking off the survivors, the Hartlepool boat bringing 13 men and the Seaton boat 11. All were transferred to a tug and taken to Middlesbrough, the boats returning to the Inner Deep. 

Referring to the evidence of John W. Parker, of the steam tug "Champion," it appears that on being informed there was a steamer ashore on the North Gare, he at once got underweigh and moved down the river, arriving off the stranded "Clavering" about 8 a.m. 

He witnessed the Seaton Carew lifeboat go out, and eventually get alongside the ship taking away some of the crew to the Inner Deep. He also saw the lifeboat make a second attempt from the same place, which failed, owing to the strength of gale and flood tide, though she almost reached the ship. The "Champion" having towed the lifeboat to the 5th buoy hole as requested, then steamed over to the coastguard station at South Gare, and asked the boatman in charge to put the rocket apparatus on board, and see what could be done with it. 

The boatman (Tribe), after telephoning to his chief officer, at Coatham, for permission to do so, put the apparatus on board, and the "Champion" then steamed over, and stopped within 150 yards of the "Clavering," when the tripod stand having been placed on the starboard side of the fore deck a rocket was fired nearly against the wind which covered the range, but passed to the east of the ship. This was about 1 o'clock. The tug master suggested that another rocket should be tried, but boatman Tribe declined, though he had two more rockets with him, and requested to be taken back to the coastguard station, which was done. 

The Court fails to understand boatman Tribe's reason for declining to make a second attempt to throw a line over the ship at this most critical juncture when the lifeboats could not get back to the vessel, and the tugs were unable to render any service; and they are of opinion that he (Tribe) is deserving of the severest censure, and request that this expression of their opinion may be communicated to the Admiral Superintendent of the Coastguard and Reserves. 

The tug "Champion," after landing the coastguard men and rocket apparatus, steamed back to the wreck, and, finding nothing more could be done, proceeded up the river to keep an engagement for which she had been employed at the Dock while doing so, and when near No. 2 gas buoy, the body of the chief officer, W. H. Pinchin, was recovered, and afterwards landed at Dock Point, Middlesbrough. 

It was suggested in the course of the enquiry that there was some difficulty with the steering of this vessel, and that she did not answer her port helm as readily as she ought to do, and that it was possible the steering gear was out of order, or not properly adjusted, because in coming down the Thames she had failed to answer her port helm in time or sufficiently to avoid a collision with the jetty at Purfleet. 

After a searching investigation into the circumstances of the case, the Court is of opinion there is not a particle of evidence to show that anything was wrong with the connections, rods, chains, or machinery of the steam steering gear which had been carefully tested on every occasion by the master, officers, and engineers before leaving dock, and also by the pilot himself before leaving Middlesbrough on the morning of the 31st January last. 

It was stated by the pilot, Mr. Ernest Harrison, that the tide following that on which the "Clavering" was lost was the highest, but on referring to the tide register kept by the Tees Conservancy Commissioners it was found that the tide following that on which the "Clavering" was wrecked was considerably lower at high water, and that consequently the tides were falling tides, and not as stated by the pilot rising tides. 

This may account in a measure for the anxiety to get the ship to sea that tide regardless of the wind and weather. 

Mr. J. H. Amos, the representative of the River Tees Commissioners, said that it was important that certain statements which had appeared in the newspapers and at the inquest regarding the number of vessels lost at the place where the "Clavering" stranded should be cleared up. He kept a list of the casualties occurring in the river, and from the record of the year 1888 there were only four instances of ships entering the river having been wrecked. 

The average number of ships entering and leaving the river was 5,165 per annum, which represented a total tonnage of 2,631,052 tons. This did not include the steam tugs and small craft. They had several vessels trading to the Tees which would draw 25 feet 6 inches of water, and he desired to impress upon the mind of the Court that they did not consider the "Clavering" anything beyond the average size, and for this there was depth of water, safety and provision. 

The following is the list of wrecks on the North Gare Sands since the year 1888: 

November 13th, 1888. Brig "Granite" entering the Tees went ashore on the North Gare behind No. 2 black buoy. Tow rope broke. 
1898. Dutch schooner went ashore in a heavy sea. 
January 30th, 1901. Steamship "Carlo," North Gare Sands. Went ashore in a snowstorm. Had no pilot on board. 
November 22nd, 1904. Schooner "Craig Alvah," on North Gare Sands. Blown ashore. Sails gone. 
and the number and tonnage of ships cleared in the Tees for the last ten years: 

Year. Ships. Tonnage. 

1897 5692 2,627,680 
1898 5298 2,485,004 
1899 5689 2,603.072 
1900 5140 2,479,851 
1901 4691 2,209,083 
1902 4945 2,379,512 
1903 4955 2,548,726 
1904 4745 2,576,301 
1905 5020 2,995,634 
1906 5533 3,405,662 
Total 51,658 26,310,525 
Average per year, 5165 ships. 2,631,052 tonnage. 

With regard to the general directions for the navigation of the Tees it is mentioned in the North Sea Pilot (part 3, 6th edition), that for a vessel to touch upon either the North or South Gare Sands when making or proceeding out of the river in heavy weather would be nearly certain destruction. Mr. Amos' report shows that only four wrecks have occurred in the last 19 years, only one of which was a steamer who had no pilot on board. 

At the conclusion of the evidence Mr. Burton submitted the following questions upon which the Board of Trade desired the opinion of the Court. 

Mr. Miller then addressed the Court on behalf of the master, pointing out that he was without local knowlege and trusting entirely to the services of the pilot. 

Mr. Noad then spoke on behalf of the owners and commented on the allegations that had been made in the course of the evidence with regard to the steering gear and the sluggishness of the vessel on the port helm. 

Mr. Harrison, the pilot, then said he had done his duty and was in his proper senses at the time of the casualty, and commander Holmes having made some few remarks on the lifeboats and the services rendered by the crew in their endeavour to save life, Mr. Burton replied on the whole case on the part of the Board of Trade. 

As the Court did not sit on the following day the 31st March, arrangements were made, and the Court went down the river in a steam tug and examined the position of the wreck and the various buoys and lights referred to, and especially the channel from Seal Sand light to the Fairway buoy. The Court consider the lighting and buoying arrangements of the river as perfect as possible. 

The Board of Trade desired the opinion of the Court upon the following questions: 

(1) What number of compasses had the vessel, were they in good order and sufficient for the safe navigation of the vessel, and when and by whom were they last adjusted? The "Clavering" had three compasses. The Standard (a patent compass by Sir William Thomson) on top of the wheelhouse, by which the courses were set and the vessel navigated, the "Second" before the wheel in the wheelhouse for steering the vessel after being corrected by the Standard, and the "Third" which was placed before the steering gear aft. They were all in good order and sufficient for the safe navigation of the vessel, but there was no evidence before the Court to show when or by whom they were last adjusted. 

(2) When the vessel left Middlesbrough on the 31st January last was she fitted with proper steam steering gear, and was it in good working order?
When the vessel left Middlesbrough on the 31st January last she was fitted with proper steam steering gear which had been tested by the officers, engineers, and pilot before leaving the dock and was in good working order. 

(3) While going down the river Tees on the morning of 31st January did the vessel steer properly? If not, what was the cause of her failing to do so?
While going down the river Tees on the morning of the 31st January last the vessel did steer properly when she had sufficient way upon her to enable her to answer her helm, but as she was a very heavy draught, and on that account obliged to proceed very slowly, the tugs had to keep her in position in the usual manner when rounding the curves of the channel, and it was also necessary to reverse the engines on several occasions to enable her to do so. 

(4) Who gave the order to the tugs to cease towing and cast off? Was the order promptly obeyed by the tug-masters?
Neither the pilot nor the master, nor anyone gave orders from the vessel for the tugs to cease towing and cast off. The tugs cast off themselves when they got down to No. 3 buoy, which is their usual practice when the vessel is in the fairway reach for sea. 

(5) What was the position of the vessel in the river when the order was given to the tugs to cast off? Ought the order to have been given before the vessel had arrived where she then was?
The vessel had just passed No. 3 gas buoy when the tugs cast off. No order was given to cast off the tugs as already explained. The tug "Hero" which was the head boat cast off at about 6.20 a.m. She is a screw boat of about 70 h.p., and did not consider it safe to go any farther. The "Challenger," which is a paddle boat, cast off after the "Hero" had got clear, but being hailed by the pilot, followed the vessel to No. 2 gas buoy before finally leaving. 

Definite arrangements should have been made with the tugs and the pilot before reaching No. 3 gas buoy, and the engines put on at full speed from that position. 

(6) After the tugs had cast off was the hawser promptly recovered by those on board the "Clavering?" Did the vessel proceed on her proper course without delay and at full speed?
After the tugs cast off the hawsers were promptly hauled on board the "Clavering" and coiled down, but the vessel did not proceed on her proper course without delay and at full speed. 

(7) Upon arriving at the mouth of the river, what was the cause of the vessel breaking off her course to port and refusing to come round under port helm? What was her position at this time? Were prompt and proper measures then taken by the pilot and the master to get the vessel on to her course again and keep her off the sand?
The cause of the vessel breaking off her course to port and refusing to come round under her port helm when she arrived at the mouth of the river, was owing to her not having sufficient headway against wind and sea; the engines being slowed down between No. 3 and No. 2 gas buoys to allow the pilot to leave the bridge and go aft and hail the tug "Challenger," caused the vessel to get somewhat out of the mid-channel course, and, as the engines were only put full speed ahead again at No. 2 buoy, the vessel had not time to gather sufficient head way to counteract the force of the head sea and the action of the tide on her starboard side after passing the South Gare lighthouse. Prompt and proper measures were taken by the pilot and the master to get the vessel on her course again, but they failed because the vessel was too near the edge of the North Gare sand. 

(8) What was the cause of the vessel becoming unmanageable and going ashore shortly after 6 a.m. of the 31st January last?
The cause of the vessel becoming unmanageable at about 6.30 a.m. and going on shore at about 7 a.m., was from the want of sufficient headway to hold her own and keep her course after passing the South Gare lighthouse, the pilot realising the danger of the position after the vessel broke off her course rang the telegraph backwards and forwards to repeat the order "full speed ahead," and ordered the helm hard a port with the hope of the vessel coming back to her course again. As she failed to do this, the engines were at this critical moment once more stopped and reversed full speed astern to bring her back. This measure was to a certain extent successful and, her head was brought round to E.N.E., but the effect of the tide on her starboard side and the stern way carried the vessel to the edge of the sand, and, it being now about two hours after high water, her heel took the ground, and when the engines were ordered full speed ahead immediately afterwards they failed to move her and she then remained fast. The wind and sea gradually forced her head round to S.S.E., and the sea commenced to break over her fore and aft. 

(9) What was the cause of the loss of the ship, and what were the circumstances in which 19 of her crew perished?
The loss of the vessel was caused by her not having sufficient headway to keep her under proper control, and in the fairway, of the channel after leaving No. 3 buoy when the tugs had cast off. A northerly gale was blowing and a heavy. north-east sea breaking on the sands caused by the ebb tide running out of the river, and against the wind, after the Gare lighthouse was passed, therefore particular care and attention was required with the steering and speed of the engines to keep her from being set to the north-west of her course towards the North Gare sands, this, unfortunately, was not done, and the vessel getting out of her course approached the sands so closely that her heel took the ground and she stranded and was lost. 

The circumstance under which 19 of her crew perished was the inability of the lifeboats to get off to her again (after their first successful attempt) until the following morning, by which time the men had been washed overboard or died from exposure. The Court is of opinion that it would have been better if the coxswain of the lifeboat had endeavoured to put the 15 men he first took off the wreck on board the tug which was standing by within 100 yards of the vessel instead of pulling to the Inner Deep, which was over half a mile distant, because in the second endeavour to reach the wreck, after a heavy pull against wind and sea, he only succeeded in getting within 50 yards of the vessel, and then had to abandon the attempt through the exhausted condition of his crew and the boat herself filling with water; on the other hand, the tug could have worked them to windward and saved the exertion of pulling out to the wreck again. 

The coxswain, in explanation of this, said that to get from the ship to the tug he would have brought the north-east sea on the boat's port quarter, and rendered her liable to capsize at any moment. By the other course, he had the sea aft and the wind on the starboard quarter, and although this was, in his opinion, the safer course to take, it rendered the second attempt to reach the vessel useless from the reasons stated. 

(10) Was the vessel navigated with proper and seamanlike care?
The vessel was navigated with proper and seamanlike care up to No. 3 buoy, when the tugs let go, and the pilot ordered the engines to be slowed down, but not afterwards. 

(11) Was the loss of the s.s. "Clavering" and the loss of life caused by the wrongful act or default of the master, Mr. James Scott, Mr. H. A. K. Bevan, second officer, Mr. Ralph Sadler, third officer, Mr. Donald Macpherson, chief engineer, or of any of them? Does blame attach to Mr. Ernest Harrison, pilot?
The loss of the s.s. "Clavering" and the loss of life were caused by the wrongful act and default of the pilot, Mr. Ernest Harrison, and serious blame attaches to him. The master, Mr. James Scott, is deserving of severe censure for not exercising more vigilant supervision in the navigation of his vessel. 

No blame attaches to Mr. H. A. K. Bevan, second officer, Mr. Ralph Sadler, third officer, or Mr. Donald Macpherson, the chief engineer. 

Attention is called to the fact that 20 and not 19 of the crew perished, viz., chief officer Pinchin, fourth engineer Campbell, cabin or officer's boy, Ah Han, and 17 Lascars, and this report and the judgment refer to the 20 lives lost. 

Dated the 3rd day of April, 1907. JOHN F. WILSON, STANLEY A. SADLER, Justices. 
We concur in the above Report. KENNETT HORE, WM. BARNETT BIGLEY, RODNEY M. LLOYD, A. GRAY, Engineer. Assessors. 

(Issued in London by the Board of Trade, on the 77th day of May, 1907.) 

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